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Why Apple lost the ebook price-fixing case

Apple lost because the courts found that it had organised five of the largest US publishers into an agreement to raise ebook prices. Under the Sherman Act, price fixing among competitors is illegal per se: a court doesn't ask whether it did any good. Apple's contracts with the publishers weren't unlawful in themselves. What sank it was the evidence that Apple used them, knowingly, to get the publishers to move together against Amazon's $9.99 price.

The 2010 contracts

By November 2009 Amazon sold 90% of all ebooks in the US, according to the facts found at trial and repeated in the Second Circuit's 2015 opinion. It bought ebooks at a wholesale price and set its own retail price, and since the first Kindle in late 2007 it had sold new releases and New York Times bestsellers for $9.99. Publishers saw that price as a threat to hardcover sales.

Apple wanted a bookstore on the iPad, which it unveiled on 27 January 2010. Its offer was the agency model: the publisher sets the consumer price and keeps 70% of each sale, and Apple takes 30% as a commission. Apple's first emails to the publishers, on 4 and 5 January, proposed caps of $14.99 for books whose hardcover list price was above $35, $12.99 below that, and $9.99 for other trade books. Several publishers balked at those limits, and Eddy Cue, the Apple senior vice president who led the talks, got Steve Jobs to accept looser ones. A new release could now cost $12.99 if its hardcover was priced $25 to $27.50, $14.99 if it cost more but no more than $30, and $16.99 to $19.99 above that.

The clause that mattered most was a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause. If any other retailer sold an ebook for less, the publisher had to cut the iBookstore price to match. The court of appeals worked through the arithmetic: on a $25 hardcover with a $12.50 wholesale price, a publisher selling through Apple at the $12.99 cap kept 70% of the price, about $9.09 a copy (the opinion prints $8.75), less than the $12.50 that Amazon paid. If Amazon stayed at $9.99, the MFN would drag the iBookstore down to $9.99 too, leaving the publisher with less money and no control of the price. In practice, signing with Apple meant forcing Amazon onto agency terms as well. Cue said as much: “any decent MFN forces the model”.

Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin and Simon & Schuster signed before the launch. Random House stayed out until early 2011. Asked after the iPad event why anyone would pay Apple $14.99 when Amazon charged $9.99, Jobs replied: “the price will be the same”.

Prices after the launch

The day after the launch, Macmillan's chief executive, John Sargent, flew to Seattle and told Amazon to accept agency terms or wait seven months for Macmillan's new releases. Amazon took away the option to buy Macmillan's print and ebook titles, then gave way: it had agency terms with Macmillan by 5 February 2010. Three more publishers followed by March and Penguin in June.

According to the court of appeals, in the five months after the iBookstore opened those publishers priced 85.7% of their new releases on the Kindle at or just below Apple's caps, and 96.8% of their bestsellers. Random House's prices barely moved. An expert for the Justice Department measured the change from February 2010 to February 2011: the weighted average price of the five publishers' new releases rose 24.2%, bestsellers 40.4%, and all their ebooks together 23.9%. Some publishers also raised hardcover list prices so that the ebook edition fell into a higher price band.

The suit and the settlements

The Justice Department sued Apple and the five publishers on 11 April 2012, and 33 states and territories brought their own case. Hachette, HarperCollins and Simon & Schuster settled the same day. Penguin followed on 18 December 2012, agreeing to end its contracts with Apple and other retailers and, for two years, to sign none that limited retailers' discounts. Macmillan settled in February 2013; Sargent said a loss could have cost more than the company was worth. The publishers paid $166 million to ebook buyers in all.

The trial

Apple went to trial alone. The bench trial before Judge Denise Cote in Manhattan began on 3 June 2013 and lasted three weeks; she ruled on 10 July 2013, as the Nebraska attorney general's office summarised the case. She found that Apple had orchestrated a conspiracy among the publishers to raise prices, a horizontal price-fixing agreement that was illegal per se, and that it failed the more forgiving rule-of-reason test as well.

Apple's defence was that its terms made commercial sense for a newcomer: an agency model, caps and an MFN guaranteed it a small profit on every sale, and if the publishers then used them against Amazon, Apple had at most facilitated that without meaning to. Both courts rejected this because of how Apple behaved. It assured each publisher that the others were getting identical terms, Sargent told Cue about the Seattle trip in advance, and Cue's team watched Kindle prices change. When Penguin's Amazon deal lagged, Cue told Jobs that Apple was moving a batch of Penguin titles to $9.99. Judge Cote found Cue's testimony on several of these points not credible. Her injunction of 5 September 2013 barred Apple from enforcing MFNs with publishers, made it treat ebook apps like any other app in its store, and provided for an outside monitor to check that Apple complied.

The appeal

A panel of the Second Circuit upheld the ruling 2 to 1 on 30 June 2015. Judge Debra Ann Livingston wrote that a company at one level of a market which organises a price-fixing cartel among firms at another level (a hub-and-spoke conspiracy) is judged by the per se rule just as its co-conspirators are. Raymond Lohier, the other judge in the majority, agreed on that point; Livingston alone added that Apple would also lose under the rule of reason. The third judge, Dennis Jacobs, dissented. As the majority described his view, he accepted that Apple had organised the conspiracy but thought it was entitled to, as a way into a market Amazon dominated. Livingston called that idea “marketplace vigilantism”.

Apple petitioned the Supreme Court in October 2015, and on 7 March 2016 the court declined to hear the case. That left the 2013 judgment in place.

The $450 million

In June 2014, two months before a damages trial at which the states and a class of buyers were expected to seek up to $840 million, Apple agreed to an unusual settlement that depended on its appeal. As Reuters reported, Apple would pay $400 million to consumers and $50 million to lawyers if it lost, $50 million and $20 million if the case went back to Judge Cote, and nothing if it won outright. Cote approved it on 21 November 2014.

The Supreme Court's refusal triggered the $400 million payment. From June 2016, people who had bought the affected ebooks between 1 April 2010 and 21 May 2012 got $6.93 for each New York Times bestseller and $1.57 for every other title. Amazon, Apple, Barnes & Noble and Kobo customers received account credits automatically; Sony and Google customers were sent cheques.